Petri nets are used in this paper to estimate the indirect consequences of accidents in a railway network, which belongs to the class of the so-called transportation Critical Infrastructures (CIs), that is, those assets consisting of systems, resources and/or processes whose total or partial destruction, or even temporarily unavailability, has the effect of significantly weakening the functioning of the system. In the proposed methodology, a timed Petri ne<t represents the railway network and the trains travelling over the rail lines; such a net also includes some places and some stochastically-timed transitions that are used to model the occurrence of unexpected events (accidents, disruptions, and so on) that make some resources of the network (tracks, blocks, crossovers, overhead line, electric power supply, etc.) temporarily unavailable. The overall Petri net is a live and bounded Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) that can be analyzed by exploiting the steady-state probabilities of a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) that can be derived from the reachability graph of the GSPN. The final target of such an analysis is to determine and rank the levels of criticality of transportation facilities and assess the vulnerability of the whole railway network.
Introduction
In the last two decades, the interest of institutions, managers, enterprises, and researchers has been focused on improving the safety and security levels of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). In particular, as regards transportation systems, the interest about this topic has grown due not only to the potentially very high number of people killed or injured when an incident or accident occurs (direct losses), but also to the high costs and the large amount of time
In the last two decades, the interest of institutions, managers, enterprises, and researchers has been focused on improving the safety and security levels of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). In particular, as regards transportation systems, the interest about this topic has grown due not only to the potentially very high number of people killed or injured when an incident or accident occurs (direct losses), but also to the high costs and the large amount of time needed in many cases to restore the infrastructure (indirect losses). Moreover, the main characteristic that makes CI safety and security a particularly important problem to tackle with is the mutual interdependence of their components whose operation depends on the proper functioning of all the others; this is especially true in railway networks where the occurrence of unexpected accidental events (hereafter referred to as safety or failure events) makes some resources of the network (tracks, blocks, crossovers, overhead line, electric power supply, etc.) temporarily unavailable, with consequences that are in some cases amplified by the chain-effect phenomenon resulting from the interdependency of resources. A methodology to assess the consequences of failures in a railway network is presented in this paper; it is based on Petri Nets (PNs), which have been proven to be a valuable and powerful modelling tool to represent and analyze the behavior of discrete event systems, as they are able to capture the precedence relations and interactions among the concurrent and asynchronous events typical of such systems.
While for specific literature relevant to security and safety of critical infrastructures the reader may refer to Lewis (2006) and Macaulay (2008) , the problem of assessing the criticality of infrastructures has been faced in Arulselvan et al. (2009) , where an approach based on the graph theory is proposed to detect the most critical nodes in large networks. Although the graph theory appears to be a suitable tool for such analyses, Petri Nets may represent a better modelling formalism, being capable to model in a unique framework different kinds of dynamics and to easily model concurrency and synchronism of different events, often in a modular way. In this framework, an interesting application of PNs to infrastructure interdependence analysis is described in Gursesli and Desrochers (2003) where different kinds of critical infrastructures are modelled in a unique framework and some considerations about interdependence of CIs are provided by applying the analysis of PN structural properties (Murata, 1989) . In addition, the "intrinsic modularity" of PNs is useful whenever a large network of different kinds of infrastructures has to be considered, such as, for instance, an electric power distribution network and a railway transportation network. For what concerns the modelling capabilities of PNs in the field of transportation engineering, they have been put into evidence by the relevant vast literature. For the cases of highway networks or urban transportation networks, readers can refer, for instance, to Tolba et al. (2005) and Di Febbraro et al. (2016) . Instead, for the case of railway systems here considered, it can be mentioned the works of Ren and Zhou (1995) , Fanti et al. (2006) , Hagalisetto et al. (2007) , Giua and Seatzu (2008) , Ricci (2009), and Liu et al. (2016) . Recently, in Giglio and Sacco (2016) a very detailed Petri Net representation of a railway traffic system has been proposed, with the aim of providing a comprehensive model to be used for analysis, optimization, and control purposes. In this paper, that model is taken into account to analyze the CIs characterizing the railway network and assess the level of criticality of failure events.
The level of criticality of a safety or failure event which affects one or more transportation facility is here considered as the product of a value representing the impact of the occurrence of the event on the system's operation with the probability of being in a state which is affected by the event. This is consistent with the classic definition of risk. In general, the impact is assessed through the computation of a weighted sum of the estimations of some losses (both direct and indirect) caused by the occurrence of the event. In the proposed Petri net-based approach, the impact of a certain failure event will be determined directly by means of the reachability graph of the generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) representing the railway network, whereas the probability of occurrence of the event will be calculated through the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) that can be derived from the GSPN taking into account the tangible states of the reachability graph, the firing rates of exponentially-timed transitions, and the stochastic switches associated with immediate transitions.
The railway network and the adopted Petri net model
The proposed Petri net-based model of a railway network consists of two interconnected PNs that represent, respectively, the physical part of the network (stations, blocks, crossovers, tracks, and so on, as well as the rolling stock moving on the network) and the logical part of it (train schedule over the available lines). A sketch of a railway network with 7 stations and 8 railways is reported in Fig. 1(a) , whereas in Fig. 1 (b) the overall PN model is illustrated. The two nets have been described in detail in Giglio and Sacco (2016) , to which the reader can refer for more details on the modelling approach. The extension presented in this paper is aimed at representing the occurrence of accidents, disruptions, and other unexpected events that make some resources of the network unavailable; this is done by including in the Timed Petri Net (TPN) modelling the physical part of the system some places and some stochastically-timed transitions whose firings model such failure events; the resulting net is the "extended" TPN depicted in Fig. 1 (b) which is actually a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net. Since the proposed methodology to determine the levels of criticality of transportation facilities requires that the GSPN is live and bounded, a Petri net supervisor is employed to model real railway operational constraints so that the reach of some states is prevented (in particular, deadlock states); nevertheless, due to the lack of space, such a net is not described in this paper. Besides, also the logical part of the overall PN model, including the PN actuator, is not considered here as it is not strictly pertinent to the research presented in this paper. 
The extended TPN of the physical part
The representation of failure events in the railway network is briefly illustrated in the following by means of the PN reported in Fig. 2 , which models a block section within a railway. In such a net, places from " to "" (resp., from "# to ## ) and transitions from " to "% (resp., from "& to '( ) model the left (resp., right) track of the double-track railway section, whereas places #' -#) and transitions '* -'% model the physical availability of the block section. With regards to the left track, a northbound train is represented by a token which enters " and reaches ) by passing through either # -# -) (in case of reduced speed) or ' -' -+ (nominal speed). Transitions * and % model a train failure (for instance due to an engine failure) which occurs when the train is travelling the block section, and & represents the repair process which makes the train able to restart its travel; * , % , and & are timed transitions whose firing time is distributed exponentially in order to properly model the randomness of the (memoryless) fault events. Analogous considerations can be made for a southbound train (the token representing the train flows from * to ", and for the part of the net relevant to the right track. An accident involving the whole block section (such as, for instance, a mudslide) is modelled through the firing of '* which moves the token in #' to #) ; in such a marking, the absence of a token in #' prevents the firing of immediate transitions " , ", , "& , and #% which means that trains cannot enter the disrupted block section until it is repaired (the repair process is represented through the firing of '% which put back the token to #' ). . Di Febbraro, D. Giglio, N. Sacco / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) 000-000 As discussed in the introduction, in a critical infrastructure some resources depend on the proper availability of some other resources; for example, in a railway network, the block and crossover sections constituting a railway line are available only if the overhead line provides power to the railway line; in other words, a failure event affecting the overhead line prevents the execution of any travel activity on the involved block and crossover sections. In the proposed model, this is represented with the Petri net structure illustrated in Fig. 3 . In such a part of the whole "extended TPN", the considered failure event is modelled through the firing of )# which put tokens to #& ( is the number of blocks and crossovers connected to the overhead line); due to the arcs between the portion of the net in the left part of Fig. 3 (which actually represents the physical availability of block sections powered by the overhead line) and #& , )' , and '" in the right part, the tokens in #& and the firings of immediate transition )' remove all tokens from the left part, making all the block sections no longer available until the line is restored (this happens when )) fires and the token is put back to #% ). In a similar way, it is possible to model the dependency of the overhead lines from an electric power supply which provides power to a subset of adjacent overhead lines; in this case, an electric power failure impedes any connected overhead line to properly work.
On determining the levels of criticality of transportation facilities
The level of criticality of a certain transportation resource or facility is determined from the Petri net model described in the previous section; in particular, the reachability graph is used to assess the impact of a certain failure event, and the continuous-time Markov chain that can be derived from the reachability graph is used to determine the probability of occurrence of the event. The impact and the probability of occurrence of a certain event lead to the determination of the level of the relevant criticality. In this connection, let a failure event / , ℎ = 1, 2, …, be described by the markings of places that characterize the states after the occurrences of the event; as an example, with reference to the part of the net represented in Fig. 3 , the event "overhead line failure" is characterized by the absence of a token in #% and by the presence of one or more tokens in #& or one token in ', ; thus it can be defined as " = #% = 0 ∧ #& > 1 ∨ ', = 1 . Giving the reachability graph and being > the generic marking of , the set of markings of the graph in which the failure event / is active is defined as (it is determined taking into account the tangible states of the reachability graph, the firing rates of exponentially-timed transitions, and the stochastic switches associated with immediate transitions) and being > the generic node of it, the probability of occurrence of the failure event / is
Finally, the level of criticality of the failure event / is given by
and the vulnerability of the whole railway network is assessed at
being ℰ = / , ℎ = 1, 2, … the set including all the failure events affecting the system. In order to better explain the proposed methodology, a toy example is taken into account. Let consider the Petri net illustrated in Fig. 4 , which models a simple system consisting of three resources A, B, and C which are used by two kinds of clients, namely clients 1 and clients 2, to carry out some activities (whose duration is exponentiallydistributed). Places "" , "# , and "' model the state (availability or non-availability) of resources A, B, and C, respectively. Clients 1 can use either resource A (modelled by the sequence of places and transitions " -" -# -# -( ) or resource B (sequence " -+ -) -( -( ) to perform its activity, whereas clients 2 are allowed to use resource B only (sequence * -", -% -"" -", ). All activities need the availability of resource C to start; thus, resource C can be considered as a primary "global" resource with respect to the secondary "local" resources A and B. Each activity is renewed after its completion; in this connection, transitions & and ") represent the renewal processes of activities of client 1 and client 2, respectively. It can be noted that such an example is analogous to the case of a block section with two parallel tracks, in which trains (clients) 1 can use the two of them, while trains (clients) 2 can use only one.
A disruption may affect a client when it is using resource A or B; in this case, the involved client keeps the resource occupied until it is repaired; once repaired, the client leaves the system and the resource is again available. In the net of Fig. 4 , disruptions are modelled with exponentially-timed transitions ' (for clients of type 1 when using resource A), * (again for clients of type 1 but when using resource B), and "# (for clients of type 2). The repair activities, which are obviously mandatory when a client suffers a disruption, are respectively modelled with exponentially-timed transitions ) , % , and "' . The primary resource C is also failure-prone; it can suddenly break (due to unexpected events) thus preventing the start of any activity on both resource A and B; in the Petri net, the . Di Febbraro, D. Giglio, N. Sacco / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) failure of resource C and its consequent repair process are modelled with exponentially-timed transitions "+ and "( , respectively; besides, the firing of "+ (which moves the token in "' to ") ) prevents the firing of immediate transitions " , + , and ", that represent the starts of activities. It is evident that 4 kinds of failure events affect the system, which are defined as follows:
• " = ' = 1 (disruption of client 1 when using resource A); • # = + = 1 (disruption of client 1 when using resource B); • ' = & = 1 (disruption of client 2 when using resource B); • ) = ") = 1 (break down of resource C).
As a matter of fact, such an example is a simplification of the Petri net model of a block section in a railway and therefore can be taken as representative of the considered problem. The reachability graph of the Petri net is illustrated in Fig. 5 and the list of reachable markings is reported in Table 1 . From the table it results that the sets / , with ℎ = 1, 2, …, are:
which means that the impacts of the failure events are:
In order to compute the steady-state probabilities of being, in a generic time instant, in a certain tangible state of the graph, the CTMC associated with the considered GSPN (which is a live and bounded net) is determined. In this connection, the firing rates and the stochastic switches reported in Tables 2 and 3 are taken into consideration.   M3   M5   M4  M1  M2   M9  M11  M10  M7  M8  M6  M12   M16  M18  M17  M14  M15   M13   M19  M22   M24   M23  M20  M21   M25  M26  M27  M28   M0   M29  M32  M33  M30  M31   M34  M37  M38  M35 M36 Table 1 . Markings of the reachability graph of the Petri net illustrated in Fig. 4 (the notation [ ñM used in the "Next Markings" column means that the next marking M is reached by firing transition c ). Type  M0 ( 1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) [1ñM1 ; [5ñM2 ; [10ñM3 ; [15ñM4 vanishing M1 (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) [2ñM5 ; [3ñM6 ; [10ñM7 ; [15ñM8 vanishing M2 (0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) [6ñM5 ; [7ñM9 ; [15ñM10 tangible M3 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) [1ñM7 ; [11ñM11 ; [12ñM12 ; [15ñM13 vanishing M4 (1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1) [16ñM0 tangible M5 (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) [9ñM0 ; [10ñM14 ; [15ñM15 vanishing M6 (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) [4ñM5 ; [10ñM16 ; [15ñM17 vanishing M7 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) [2ñM14 ; [3ñM16 ; [11ñM18 ; [12ñM19 ; [15ñM20 tangible M8 (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) [2ñM15 ; [3ñM17 ; [16ñM1 tangible M9 (0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) [8ñM5 ; [15ñM20 tangible M10 (0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) [6ñM15 ; [7ñM20 ; [16ñM2 tangible M11 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0) [1ñM18 ; [5ñM21 ; [14ñM0 ; [15ñM22 vanishing M12 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0) [1ñM19 ; [13ñM11 ; [15ñM23 vanishing M13 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1) [11ñM22 ; [12ñM23 ; [16ñM3 tangible M14 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) [9ñM3 ; [11ñM24 ; [12ñM25 ; [15ñM26 tangible M15 (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1) [9ñM4 ; [16ñM5 tangible M16 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) [4ñM14 ; [11ñM27 ; [12ñM28 ; [15ñM29 tangible M17 (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) [4ñM15 ; [16ñM6 tangible M18 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0) [2ñM24 ; [3ñM27 ; [14ñM1 ; [15ñM30 tangible M19 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0) [2ñM25 ; [3ñM28 ; [13ñM18 ; [15ñM31 tangible M20 (0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) [15ñM38  tangible  M33 (0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1) [6ñM34 ; [7ñM38 ; [14ñM10 ; [16ñM21 tangible M34 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1) [9ñM22 ; [14ñM15 ; [16ñM24 tangible M35 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) [9ñM23 ; [13ñM34 ; [16ñM25 tangible M36 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1) [4ñM34 ; [14ñM17 ; [16ñM27 tangible M37 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) [4ñM35 ; [13ñM36 ; [16ñM28 tangible M38 (0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1) [8ñM34 ; [14ñM20 ; [16ñM32 tangible . Di Febbraro, D. Giglio, N. Sacco / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) After having built the matrix Q and determined the steady-state probabilities of being in the tangible markings of the CTMC (by solving the system of linear equalities πQ = 0 with π u u = 1), the probabilities of occurrence of the failure events turn out to be the following ones:
Label Marking Next Markings
• Pr " = 2.4501 • 10 h' ; • Pr # = 1.3378 • 10 h' ; • Pr ' = 7.6165 • 10 h' ; • Pr ) = 1.6393 • 10 h# ;
and, consequently, the levels of criticality of the failure events are:
• and the vulnerability of the whole railway network is assessed at SYS = 1.0189 • 10 h# . In conclusion, the most critical failure event among those considered in this toy example is the breakdown of the "global" resource C.
Conclusions
In this paper, a methodology to assess, from a quantitative point of view, the accident events that affect a Critical Infrastructure has been presented with specific reference to the case of railway networks. The proposed methodology is applied to the detailed Petri net representation of the system and exploits the properties of the Generalized Stochastic Petri Net, that can be analyzed by means of the Markov chain theory. As future research direction, in order to limit some computational troubles in the determination of the reachability graph of the net, an efficient building procedure can be defined by exploiting the modularity of the adopted Petri net representation.
